INTRODUCTION
This study investigates the economic consequences of going concern audit reports (GCARs) in nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in order to evaluate the usefulness of GCARs in the nonprofit setting. A well-established literature has examined and documented investor reactions to GCARs in the for-profit world, but there is no similar evidence for the nonprofit setting. NPOs do not issue stock but rely on donations, government grants, and debt. Knowing whether GCARs play a role in donors' and grantors' contributing decisions and creditors' lending decisions can help policy makers to assess its information content and make policy judgments about auditing in the nonprofit sector.
I expect that a GCAR contains incremental information on an NPO because NPOs generally have few information intermediaries, and auditors possess on-site information unavailable to outsiders and can convey the information via GCARs. A GCAR reflects auditors' pessimistic views of an NPO. Therefore, if a GCAR carries new information about an NPO, the NPO's donations, government grants (grants hereafter), and debt should decline. In contrast, the lack of evidence on adverse economic impacts of GCARs will allow regulators to reallocate limited resources to monitor other aspects of NPOs than GCARs.
My findings show that GCARs negatively impact the level of contributions after NPOs receive their initial GCARs, suggesting that GCARs may cause adverse economic consequences for NPOs. I also find that a GCAR reduces the subsequent grants that an NPO receives, indicating that the government reacts negatively to a GCAR. However, I find no supporting evidence that a GCAR reduces public support (as well as direct support and indirect support) that an NPO receives in the post-GCAR year. The level of debt that an NPO receives after the GCAR-year significantly decreases, indicating that creditors may restrict their lending to GCARreceiving NPOs.
The paper focuses on NPOs receiving initial GCARs during Single Audits because initial
GCARs contain more incremental information content, if any. It is a particularly difficult decision for auditors to issue a first-time GCAR (Kida 1980; Mutchler 1984) . 1 Auditors will not lift going concern opinions unless the client's conditions significantly improve (Nogler 1995) .
This study primarily contributes to the line of research on going concern reports. To my knowledge, this paper offers the first multivariate analysis to document the economic consequences of GCARs in NPOs and evaluate whether GCARs contain incremental information content in the nonprofit world. The findings can be helpful for regulators to assess the value of GCARs in the nonprofit world. The evidence that GCARs have information content may motivate policymakers to enhance the public access to the audit reports of NPOs.
The following section introduces the background. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature and develops hypotheses. Section 4 specifies research methodology and describes the sample selection procedures. Section 5 presents empirical results for main analyses and robustness tests. The final section summarizes the study and provides conclusions. The Single Audit Act of 1984 (OMB 1996 (OMB , 2007 took effect in 1986 and covers all fifty states, most of the more than 80,000 state and local governmental units, and many NPOs. The Act requires CPA-performed audits on annual financial statements for NPOs that have federal expenditures above $500,000 ($300,000 before December 31, 2003).
II. BACKGROUND: GCARs AND BANKRUPTCIES IN NPOs
SAS No. 59 (AICPA 1988) provides guidelines for auditors to make appropriate going concern judgments and require auditors to include a going concern explanatory paragraph in an audit report if they have substantial doubts about an entity's ability to operate continuously for one year beyond the auditing date for the financial statements. Single Audit requirements extend well beyond those for Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and Government
Auditing Standards (GAGAS) audits. Keating et al. (2005) Oleck 1992). The lower frequency of bankruptcy in NPOs is perhaps due to high exiting costs (such as attorney fees and efforts to distribute assets) and management's incapability of profiting from liquidation or mergers. When NPOs go bankrupt, the losses to beneficiaries are high because it is difficult to find substitutes for the public goods offered by NPOs.
Despite the rarity of GCARs and bankruptcies in NPOs, the subsequent adverse effects combined with potential reputation losses may motivate NPO managements to make every effort to avoid bankruptcy or GCARs. For instance, in order to continue as a going concern, Kansas City decided to close 29 out of 61 schools in the district at the end of 2010 school year (Hollingswoth 2010) when the district faced potential bankruptcy. 
III. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
A GCAR is a negative signal for an NPO. Whether such "bad news" contains incremental information content has been an on-going debate in the for-profit literature. One strand of research reports no negative market reaction to GCARs (Elliott 1982; Dodd et al. 1984; Blay and Geiger 2001; Herbohn et al. 2007 ) while the other strand of research finds significant negative market reaction to GCARs (Fleak and Wilson 1994; Jones 1996) . In a more recent study, Menon For instance, only 25 out of 50 states require audited reports from NPOs that have revenues above a minimum threshold. The minimum thresholds differ by state. For example, Connecticut requires audits when gross revenues exceed $200,000 while New Hampshire and Massachusetts demand audits when gross revenues are above $500,000. The Single Audit Act (OMB 1996) demands audited financial statements only if annual federal expenditures of an NPO are above $500,000 (as opposed to $300,000 before December 31, 2003). In addition, there is no quarterly reporting of NPOs, and NPOs can file their financial statements as long as nine months after their fiscal year end. since the purpose of making contributions is to increase an NPO's service or provision level. 4 Therefore, the preceding arguments lead to the first hypothesis:
The level of contributions decreases after an NPO receives a GCAR.
Contributions of an NPO include public support and government grants. Public support consists of donations directly from individuals and foundations (direct support) and donations from federated fundraising campaigns such as the United Way (indirect support). On one hand, donors may respond negatively to a GCAR of an NPO and discontinue their donations to the GCAR-receiving NPO because they doubt the NPO can continue to carry out its missions. On the other hand, some donors may pitch in to help the organization to survive. Other donors may seek a warm glow (Andreoni 1990; Ribar and Wilhelm 2002) and a GCAR may not affect their donation decisions. In addition, donors (especially individual donors) do not have direct access to an NPO's audit reports unless media exposes the high profile NPOs that have received GCARs or donors take efforts to obtain A-133 audit reports under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Therefore, the net effect of a GCAR on donations is unclear. However, to keep the hypothesis in a consistent format, I use the alternative hypothesis rather than the null form:
The level of public support decreases after an NPO receives a GCAR.
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For example, donors offer their support in order to increase the frequency or quality of art exhibits, increase the number of children fed or educated in developing countries, or help low income people to earn more (Vesterlund 2006) . Donors are reluctant to make contributions just to pay the debt of a financially distressed college without directly support a mission (O'Neil and Barnett 1980 
The Impact of GCARs on Debt
NPOs borrow debt to obtain funding to purchase equipment and buildings or span the time between expenses and grant receipts (Yetman 2007) . The Internal Revenue Service's Statistics of Income files report that over 60 percent of NPOs owe some form of debt. Debt financing in NPOs is pervasive perhaps due to lack of access to the equity market.
In a recent for-profit study, Menon and Williams (2010) find that a GCAR may be a useful incremental indicator of the firm's difficulties in servicing debt or in raising capital. On the other hand, a GCAR may increase contracting costs and therefore raise the likelihood of bankruptcy, e.g. the "self-fulfilling prophecy" effect of GCARs. Higher contract costs may derive from downgraded credit rating, stricter listing requirements from stock exchanges, and increased difficulties in obtaining credit from bank or other lenders. Some debt may carry restrictive covenants that require the firm to prepare financial statements without a GCAR, and the borrower may have to incur substantial costs to renegotiate the loan, either through higher interest rates or other strict debt terms. They contend that investors react more negatively to the announcement of a GCAR when there is a debt covenant that restricts the firm from receiving a GCAR.
For nonprofits, I expect that GCARs adversely affect the level of debt that an NPO receives. A GCAR reflects auditors' pessimistic views about an NPO's financial conditions and thus reduce creditors' confidence in the NPO. A GCAR may result in the breach of loan covenants or lead to higher contracting costs, such as a lower credit rating, the increased cost of existing debt. It is also possible that some debt covenants restrict the NPO from receiving a GCAR. Creditors may become more reluctant to lend to GCAR-receiving NPOs fearing that these NPOs may not be able to repay their loans. However, I recognize that the decline in debt could result from financial distress as well. Therefore, the second hypothesis is as follows:
The debt load decreases after an NPO receives a GCAR.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The Consequence Model for the Impact of GCARs on Contributions I follow Petrovits et al. (2011) and use the following Model 1 to test whether GCARs have negative effects on the level of contributions after an NPO receives a GCAR:
For example, in the footnotes to the 1999 financial statements of Mon Yough Community Services, Inc. in McKeesport, Pennsylvania, the entity disclosed that "these negative trends have continued resulting in requirements by its primary lender to prohibit further borrowings from its line of credit and for management to submit a corrective action plan prior to any consideration of potential future financing arrangements."
The dependent variable is LnContributions. To examine the impact of GCARs on public support and government grants, I replace the dependent variable with LnPublicSupport and LnGovernmentGrants to re-estimate Model 1. The variable of interest is GCAR. I expect a negative coefficient for GCAR (i.e., α 1 < 0), implying that receiving a GCAR reduces the total contributions that an NPO receives in the post-GCAR year. Yet there may be unobservable differences between the NPOs that receive a GCAR and the NPOs without a GCAR that auditors take into their going concern considerations but are omitted in the model. To mitigate the selection bias, I apply the Heckman's (1979) two-stage estimation method. In the first stage, I
use the GCAR likelihood probit model developed by Feng (2010) to calculate the Inverse Mills ratio. The price of donating measures how many dollars of after-tax income that a donor must give up in order to provide one additional dollar to an NPO's final output. Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) and Petrovits et al. (2011) consider price a function of the program service ratio and the tax benefit of donating.
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Both studies find a significant negative relationship 6 Feng (2010) develops the GCAR likelihood model (see Appendix for variable definitions): Where FUND is the fundraising expenditures and DON is the "Contributions, gifts and grants" received by an NPO in the previous period. They set the percentage of revenue devoted to administration at zero because they think that satisfactory data on these expenses are unavailable. Since the donor's tax rate is uniform across all NPOs, the price reduces to the ratio of total expenses to program services expenses. (Tinkelman 2004) . I also include the lagged contributions to control for other organization characteristics. Model 1 also controls for the industry and fixed year effects.
Contributions do not instantaneously reflect the impact of influencing factors, because contributors cannot retroactively make their contribution decisions. Therefore, I expect that contributions are sensitive to the indicators of organizational performance in the preceding accounting period. In the models with LnPublicSupport and LnGovernmentGrants, I use the corresponding lagged public support or government grants as control variables respectively.
The Consequence Models for the Impact of GCARs on Debt
Wedig et al. (1988, 1996) have studied tax-exempt debt and the capital structure of nonprofit organizations for nonprofit hospitals, but not for general NPOs. To test the effects of GCARs on the level of debt, I use Model 2:
GCAR is the variable of interest. Per H 2 , I expect the coefficient η 1 to be negative because creditors may become reluctant to make loan to the NPO fearing that the NPO is unable to repay the loan. When an NPO has more revenues, there is less need for the NPO to borrow debt, so I anticipate a negative coefficient for LnRevenue . If an NPO has low operating reserves, the need to borrow is high. However, creditors may deny an NPO with low operating reserves because they suspect the NPO cannot service the loan. Thus, the coefficient η 4 is expected to be negative. 
Going Concern Sample
The going concern sample consists of NPOs that received an initial GCAR between 1998 and 2003 in the FAC Database. I select this study period because Digitized Files in the NCCS Database contain necessary financial data on public charities from 1998 to 2003.
8 Table 1 Panel A shows the sample selection process. The final sample includes 405 NPOs that received their initial GCARs within the study period.
[PLEASE SEE According to the NCCS staff, they cannot compile another set of Digitized Files with more recent data due to a lack of funding. Therefore, the study period of the main analyses extends only until 2003. Chen and Church (1992) and Mutchler (1984 Mutchler ( , 1985 have noted that in the for-profit setting, auditors first identify problem NPOs and then decide whether to issue GCARs. To examine whether their selection criteria apply to NPOs, I have collected 172 going concern audit reports out of the sample through the FOIA procedure. I rank the reasons for issuing GCARs by the frequency that auditors have cited each justification in GCARs, and the top three reasons are:
Control Sample
(1) negative net assets or insolvency (i.e., total liabilities are greater than total assets); (2) losses; or (3) negative working capital. Therefore, control group includes NPOs that meet at least one of the three criteria. For each going concern NPO, I find a peer NPO that has the closest total assets within the same NTEE and fiscal year combination. Thus, the control group consists of 405 NPOs through the aforementioned matching process.
In order to mitigate the impact of outliers, I winsorize main financial data at the 1% and 99% levels after selecting the control group.
V. RESULTS

Univariate Analyses
The Yearly and Sector Distributions of the Sample Out of 172 collected GCARs, 90 GCARs were issued because of an NPO's net asset deficiency, 83 GCARs were issued because of an NPO's significant or recurring losses, and 57 GCARs were issued because of an NPO's working capital deficiencies.
ones. The Arts, Culture, and Humanities (1%) and Other sectors (2%) are two smallest groups.
The sector distribution is generally consistent with that of the NPO population. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the first-time GC sample and the control sample in the year when an NPO received its initial GCAR. Panel A compares the balance sheet items between the two groups. Paired t-tests for the differences in means reveal that, on average, going concern NPOs have higher long-term debt (t=2.70, p-value at the 1% level) and total liabilities (t=2.34, p-value at the 5% level), and lower unrestricted net assets (t=-2.48, p-value at the 1% level) and total net assets (or fund balances) (t=-2.36, p-value at the 5% level) than peer NPOs.
The Going Concern (GC) Sample and its Control Group
In addition, the GC sample borrows more debt and has fewer unrestricted net assets to draw upon for operational activities. Panel A suggests that the GC sample may have higher financing risk than its peer group.
[PLEASE SEE Panel B compares revenues and expenses between the GC sample and the control group.
The paired t-test statistics suggest that in general, the GC sample receives less direct (t=-1.90, pvalue at the 10% level) and indirect public support (t=-2.97, p-value at the 1% level). More importantly, the GC sample has a larger deficit (t=-2.35, p-value at the 5% level) than its peer group, indicating that GCAR-receiving NPOs are more financially distressed than their peers.
The GC Sample in the Post-GCAR Periods
I also obtain the descriptive statistics of these NPOs in the year after the GCAR issuance in order to investigate conditions of the GCAR-receiving NPOs after they received their firsttime GCARs. Table 3 Panel A displays descriptive statistics of the balance sheet items. The mean total assets of these 305 NPOs in the post-GCAR year are higher than the sample mean.
NPOs in the post-GCAR period also have higher means in current assets, current liabilities, longterm debt, total liabilities, temporarily restricted and permanently restricted net assets than those in the GCAR-year. Panel B shows that the means of program service revenues ($9.5 million) and total revenues ($12.5 million) of 305 NPOs are higher than the sample means in the GCAR-year.
The evidence in Table 3 suggests that larger NPOs are perhaps more likely to survive after receiving GCARs.
[PLEASE SEE 
Pearson Correlation Matrix
The Pearson correlation between major variables is shown in Table 5 . As expected, the correlations between a GCAR and total contributions, public support and indirect support are negative, but insignificant. The correlation between a GCAR and the debt level in the post-GCAR year is unexpectedly positive. However, without controlling for other variables in a multivariate context, I cannot draw definite inferences from the correlation analysis. I also calculate the variance inflation factors using the ordinary least-squares for each regression models and find that multicollinearity is not a significant issue. Table 6 presents second-stage regression estimates for the impacts of GCARs on total contributions. The variable GCAR has a negative coefficient (-0.588), suggesting that all else equal, having a GCAR is associated with 58.8 percent fewer contributions on average in the post-GCAR year. This evidence is consistent with the first hypothesis that a GCAR has a detrimental impact on subsequent contributions and indicates that GCARs of NPOs contain substantial incremental information content. As expected, the fundraising expenses are [PLEASE SEE TABLE 6] I also estimate the impact of GCARs on the components of total contributions: public support and government grants. Table 7 presents the regression results for the impact of GCARs on public support and its components (i.e. direct support and indirect support) respectively. Surprisingly, the variable GCAR is negative, but insignificant across three regressions, suggesting that GCARs do not adversely affect public support. Some donors perhaps donate to seek a warm glow and thus do not care about GCARs. Yet other donors may be so keen to support the organization's mission that they would like to pitch in to help the NPO to survive when a GCAR is issued. The above mentioned circumstances can potentially mitigate the negative impact of GCARs on public support.
[PLEASE SEE TABLE 5]
Multivariate Analyses
[PLEASE SEE TABLE 7]
In contrast, Table 8 [PLEASE SEE TABLE 8] Finally, Table 9 presents the results for the second-stage regression estimates of Model 2.
As predicted, the coefficient on GCAR is significantly negative, suggesting that an NPO with a GCAR receives 52.6 percent less debt than an NPO without a GCAR in the post-GCAR year. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this study is to investigate the economic consequences of GCARs in NPOs, i.e., the impacts of GCARs on total contributions and debt. I examine economic consequences of GCARs on total contributions (as well as public support and government grants) and debt that an NPO receives after the entity gets its initial GCAR. The results show that the level of total contributions decreases after NPOs receive their initial GCARs. Subsequent government grants that the GCAR-recipients receive also decline, indicating that government agencies react negatively to GCARs. However, I find no evidence that a GCAR affects public support that an NPO receives. Furthermore, I find that having a GCAR reduces the subsequent debt that an NPO borrows from creditors, suggesting the adverse impact of a GCAR on debt.
The major contributions of the paper are: First, this study offers the first multivariate investigation on economic consequences of GCARs in the nonprofit setting. Second, the study documents the adverse effects GCARs have on contributions, government grants, and debt.
Examining the economic consequences of GCARs helps us to understand the value of GCARs.
Adverse economic impacts will motivate NPOs (particularly financially distressed ones) to improve financial performance, strengthen internal control, and comply with laws, regulations and contract agreements in order to mitigate the likelihood of getting a GCAR. Moreover, the findings help regulators to assess the impacts that GCARs have on nonprofit organizations and can facilitate their policy making in the nonprofit audits. I hand collected 172 GCARs via the FOIA procedure and find that 40 GCARs do not contain going concern audit opinions. I do not have a complete set of GCARs for the sample because of the difficulties in the FOIA collection process. 
APPENDIX
